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Abstract: In a recent article, I argued that the regressiveness of current public attitudes 
towards rape has been overstated, suggesting that, to a troubling extent, we are in the process 
of creating myths about myths.  The article itself and the arguments contained within it have 
provoked various responses from feminists.   While these responses proceed at times on the 
basis of misunderstandings or misinterpretations of my argument, they are helpful both in 
clarifying areas of disagreement  and in underscoring some important points of agreement - at 
times explicitly by accepting, and at other times implicitly by leaving unchallenged, some of my 
core claims.  In what follows, I aim to point out the misunderstandings or misinterpretations, 
and to clarify both the areas of assent and the areas of dissent in an attempt to move us 
towards the productive public conversation we believe we want. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent article, I argued that the regressiveness of current public attitudes 
towards rape has been overstated.1  I suggested that the claim that rape myths are 
widespread may be challenged on three grounds: first, some of the attitudes are 
not myths; secondly, not all the myths are about rape; thirdly, there is little 
evidence that the rape myths are widespread.  I suggested that, to a troubling 
extent, we are in the process of creating myths about myths.2  The article itself and 
the arguments contained within it have provoked various responses from 
feminists.3  While these responses proceed at times on the basis of 
misunderstandings or misinterpretations of my argument, they are helpful both in 
clarifying areas of disagreement and in underscoring some important points of 
agreement – at times explicitly by accepting, and at other times implicitly by 
leaving unchallenged, some of my core claims.  In what follows, I aim to point out 
the misunderstandings or misinterpretations, and to clarify both the areas of assent 
and the areas of dissent in an attempt to move us towards the productive public 
conversation we believe we want.4 
 
 
 
PARTIALITY AND PERSPECTIVE 
 
Perhaps the most developed response is that of Joanne Conaghan and Yvette 
Russell, writing recently in Feminist Legal Studies.5  At the top of their list of 
criticisms of my article is that I present myself as impartial while in fact having an 
‘agenda’. 
I have never hidden my agenda, nor claimed to be agenda-free – quite the 
opposite, as Conaghan and Russell point out, I have ‘utilized a broad range of 
public fora to disseminate [my] views in the course of which the partiality of [my] 
position emerges more explicitly’.6 Even so, their drawing attention to my ‘agenda’ 
early on in their response enables the portrayal of my views as shadowy and 
1 H. Reece, ‘Rape Myths:  Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 445 at 446. 
2 See R. B. Felson, Violence and Gender Reexamined (American Psychological Association:  Washington DC, 
2002) 170. 
3 See for example J. Conaghan and Y. Russell, ‘Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: ‘Myths about 
Myths’?’ (2014) 22 Feminist Legal Studies 25; B. Krahé, ‘Myths about Rape Myths?  Let the Evidence Speak.  
A Comment on Reece (2013)’ (2013), available at http://www.uni-
potsdam.de/fileadmin/projects/sozialpsychologie/assets/Comment_Reece_Paper.pdf; J. Temkin, ‘Is 
rape different?’, 30th October 2013, available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx
?id=2081.  
4 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 46; Reece, above n. 1 at 473. 
5 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3. 
6 Ibid. at 31. 
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sinister.  This portrayal is at times direct: ‘beneath the surface neutrality of Reece’s 
presentation’, Conaghan and Russell write, ‘lie murky, agenda-filled depths’.7  At 
other times, this portrayal occurs through putting words into my mouth.  
Complaining that I ‘couch [my] enquiry in dichotomized terms’,8 Conaghan and 
Russell prove this to be so by giving me such terms to mouth.  Chastising me for 
quoting others apparently out of context, they dispense with the need to quote me, 
in or out of context.  Objecting that my position is too polarised, they still find it 
necessary to stretch it.9  Perhaps the most misleading instance of this is to 
attribute to me ‘an insistence that rape should be viewed in exactly the same way as 
other serious crimes, that it has no claim to distinction or particularity’,10 a depiction of 
my view that is as caricatured as it is unsustainable.11  And all this is from writers 
who take exception to my use of rhetoric!12 
Once we have recognised the rhetorical power Conaghan and Russell gain 
from framing their response around my ‘agenda’, this point can be set aside, 
because they clarify: ‘Of course, adopting a particular stance is not a problem – 
academics are as entitled to their political views as anyone else’: 
 
What is problematic however is the presentation of this stance as if it were 
value-free, as if, appropriately attired in the academic respectability of the 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, it did indeed offer a wholly impartial, evidence-
based, empirically-grounded assessment of rape myth discourse.13 
 
This is a puzzling passage.  First of all, I do not present my stance as if it were 
value-free or wholly impartial.  Indeed, Conaghan and Russell continually castigate 
me for my use of rhetoric: I am rhetorically unyielding14 – I use a range of 
rhetorical techniques,15 rhetorical tactics,16 rhetorical stratagems,17 and even 
rhetorical sleights of hand,18 including emotively potent language.19  Wouldn’t this 
relentless rhetoric have given the game away that I ‘have a dog in this fight’?20  
7 Ibid. at 31; see also Temkin, above n. 3 at 28:14-29:20 minutes. 
8 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 32. 
9 See also Temkin, above n. 3 at 25:57-26:06 and 28:14-29:20 minutes. 
10 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 30, emphasis added. 
11 See further below.  A few other examples are: they claim that I regard gender bias as an historical 
aberration which law has all but cast off save for those rarely occurring instances of misogyny we occasionally encounter 
(ibid. at 40, emphases added); they attribute to me a conception of a liberal, atomized, gender-neutral 
legal subject who negotiates sex from a position of absolute equality’ (ibid. at 43, emphasis added); they 
repeatedly assert that I use ‘miscommunication’ theory to explain away ‘sex gone wrong’ (ibid. at 44 and 
45), but also and inconsistently that I assert there is a ‘truth’ to such encounters (ibid. at 45). 
12 See below. 
13 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 31. 
14 Ibid. at 25 and 27. 
15 Ibid. at 32. 
16 Ibid. at 27. 
17 Ibid. at 35. 
18 Ibid. at 34 and 46. 
19 Ibid. at 32 and 46. 
20 J. Halley, Split Decisions:  How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 2006) 15. 
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Surely even the title, ‘Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion 
Wrong?’, would put the reader on notice that this was not some arid account.   
Secondly, I find this a particularly puzzling criticism to come from feminists.  
Conaghan and Russell chide me repeatedly for my shallow understanding and 
awareness of feminist scholarship, but still I had understood feminism in general 
and Conaghan’s perspective in particular to challenge the idea that there could be ‘a 
wholly impartial, evidence-based, empirically-grounded assessment’ of anything,21 
let alone something as politically charged as rape myth discourse.  So far as social 
science questions are concerned, this is one of the insights from feminist legal 
scholarship that I have found helpful, even agreed with.  Do Conaghan and 
Russell really believe that there could be such a value-free assessment of rape myth 
discourse?  Or, more worryingly, is it that Conaghan and Russell accept that 
everyone themselves included has a political perspective when writing about rape 
myths, but find this acceptable only if writers have the correct political perspective?  
Only if the latter does their criticism achieve coherence.  It is not that I have an 
agenda, hidden or explicit, but rather that I have the wrong agenda.   
Reading this passage in the context of their article as a whole clarifies that this 
is the – most coherent but also most troubling – meaning of their complaint.  
What Conaghan and Russell object to is that I have written about rape myths 
without adopting their interpretation of a feminist perspective.22  They are 
disappointed that I did not write a different, more agreeable, account – one 
critically exploring the difficulties of feminist strategic legal engagement, for 
example,23 even though I gave this a go a few years ago,24 or one tracing the 
historical legacy of women’s subordination back to the 13th century, even though, 
as Conaghan and Russell amply demonstrate, the bookshelves bulge with various 
versions of this thesis.25     
Conaghan and Russell are especially insistent that it is imperative to hang on 
to the historical legacy of women’s subordination.26  An example that for them is 
‘particularly illustrative of the continued purchase of rape myths’27 within the law 
itself is the House of Lords decision on the admissibility of evidence of a 
complainant’s previous sexual history with a defendant in R v A (No. 2) (2001).28  
While discussion of the circumstances in which sexual history evidence may or 
may not be relevant is beyond the scope of this rejoinder,29 Conaghan and 
21 See J. Conaghan, Law and Gender (Oxford University Press:  Oxford, 2013) ch 6. 
22 See e.g. Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 37. 
23 Ibid. at 27. 
24 H. Reece, ‘“Unpalatable Messages”?  Feminist Analysis of United Kingdom Legislative Discourse on 
Stalking 1996-1997’ (2011) 19 Feminist Legal Studies 205. 
25 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 40-41. 
26 Ibid. at esp. 40-43. 
27 Ibid. at 42. 
28 [2001] UKHL 25. 
29 See N. Kibble, ‘Judicial Discretion and the Admissibility of Prior Sexual History Evidence under 
Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999:  Sometimes Sticking to your Guns 
means Shooting Yourself in the Foot:  Part 2’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 263; N. Kibble, ‘Judicial 
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Russell’s principal example is certainly neither a value-free nor an uncontentious 
example of the law being infused with rape myths.30  
This aside, it is of course right that older discourses are not universally 
superseded by newer ones: out-dated ideas live on, messily overlapping, co-
existing and conflicting with modern orthodoxies.  I recognise the persistence of 
misogynistic attitudes in my article, briefly,31 too briefly for Conaghan and 
Russell.32  And Conaghan and Russell recognise the entrenchment, within the 
criminal justice system, of the newer orthodoxy of rape myth discourse, 
commenting:  ‘Such is the level of consensus about the deleterious effects of rape 
myths on criminal justice that the policy literature is saturated with exhortations to 
disregard them’.33  But once we have recognised that rape myth discourse is now 
essential education for the range of criminal justice practitioners, integral to the 
guidance they follow, with proposals to take this further,34 it becomes at least as 
important to interrogate what has changed as it is to rake over the remnants.  
Relatedly, the entrenchment of rape myth discourse in the criminal justice system 
means that it is both important and legitimate to put rape myth discourse to proof, 
pointing out leaps of logic, absence of comparators or exaggerations of results.35  
Such interrogation is ‘a simple predicate of responsible power wielding’.36   
Let me – too briefly! – state that feminist theory and activism has been 
essential both to developing an understanding of rape and to pioneering necessary 
reforms to the legal system.  But the issue of rape is not owned by feminism, let 
alone a particular interpretation of feminism.37  Far from it, now that feminism is, 
in some respects, running things,38 it is imperative to analyse rape myth discourse 
from other angles, to see around the corners of feminism’s own construction.39   
So I plead: guilty to eschewing the orthodox feminist perspective;40 guilty to 
seeking to further my own perspective with some rhetoric (though less than 
Conaghan and Russell suggest,41 and arguably less than they volley back);42 not 
Perspectives on the Operation of s. 41 and the Relevance and Admissibility of Prior Sexual History 
Evidence:  four Scenarios:  Part 1’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 190; M. Redmayne, ‘Myths, Relationships 
and Coincidences:  The New Problems of Sexual History (2003) 7 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 
75. 
30 See further N. Kibble, ‘Uncovering Judicial Perspectives on Questions of Relevance and Admissibility 
in Sexual Offence Cases’ (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 91. 
31 Above n. 1 at 446. 
32 Above n. 3 at 40. 
33 Ibid. at 26. 
34 Reece, above n. 1. 
35 See contra Temkin, above n. 3 at 27:13 minutes. 
36 Halley, above n. 20 at 14. 
37 See Reece, above n. 24. 
38 Halley, above n. 20 at 20. 
39 See ibid. at 321. 
40 See Reece, above n. 24. 
41 In particular, some but not all of the language that Conaghan and Russell pick out is emotively potent 
(above n. 3 at 32).  When I wrote that rape researchers are associated with élite or super-élite opinion, I 
meant this quite literally, and I develop this theorisation in H. Reece, Divorcing Responsibly (Hart:  Oxford, 
2003): see further Halley, above n. 20.  It is hardly contentious that the attrition rate is ‘galloping’, nor 
does this particularly further my argument. 
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guilty to denying my perspective by disguising my argument as value-free.  
Conaghan and Russell can’t eat their cake and have it too.  In truth, I don’t object 
to my style being described as rhetorical – this was not intended as an arid article 
(not that there is anything wrong with them).  If I managed to persuade or even 
unsettle or startle with an arresting turn of phrase, I am happy.  If my OJLS article 
functions – for any reader – as a page-turner, I am delighted.  However, while I do 
not believe it is possible - and I certainly do not aim - to write neutrally about rape, 
I do believe that it is possible to select and marshal facts and evidence in support of 
an - avowedly political - argument.  I believe in truth and facts, and therefore in 
falsehoods and fictions.  I am happy to use rhetoric as a device to persuade, to trouble, 
to stop readers in their tracks, but not to trick, mislead or bamboozle.   
Conaghan and Russell imply the latter.  They write:  ‘Reece’s analysis is 
seductive.  It self-presents as balanced and meticulously researched, the dense 
footnoting suggesting mastery of the scholarly field’.43  The implication is that it is 
not meticulously researched, as if I rustled up the ‘dense footnoting’ to hoodwink 
the reader.  But Conaghan and Russell provide little evidence of such sharp 
practice.  With two exceptions, I select and marshal facts and evidence to further 
my – overtly political – argument. 
 
 
 
MEA CULPA 
 
The first exception is that I erroneously describe Donald Dripps as Donald 
Draper.  While embarrassing, all the more so since a quotation from Dripps gives 
me the title for the article,44 nothing substantive turns on this – his quotations, 
argument and reference are all accurate.45 
My second mistake is more substantial.  Re-reading my article in the light of 
Conaghan and Russell’s, and particularly Barbara Krahé’s,46 criticisms, I now see 
42 Aside from my ‘murky, agenda-filled depths’ (Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 31), a few examples 
are: ‘a mountain of evidence’ indicates that rape myths are widely held (ibid. at 26, emphasis added); ‘It is 
difficult to gauge from a close reading of the text to what extent Reece consciously resorts to 
legerdemain’ (ibid. at 36), but even though it is difficult to gauge, the implication hangs there (cf D. 
Davison, ‘Logic: another form of female oppression’ (2014), available at 
http://www.avoiceformen.com/feminism/logic-another-form-of-female-oppression/); two references to 
my ‘repeated’ iteration of a quotation from Mary Koss (Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 35 and 36), 
which I in fact cite on two occasions, on the second of which I refer back to the original citation to 
conclude the discussion which opened with the quotation; a negative image of woman is ‘immortalized in 
legal discourse as the myth that ‘women cry rape’ (ibid. at 41, emphasis added); they refer to my ‘collusion 
in the ready ontological distinction of rape and sex’ (ibid. at 43, emphasis added). 
43 Above n. 3 at 31, emphases added. 
44 D. Dripps, ‘After Rape Law:  Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution of Sexual Assault?’ 
(2008) 41 Akron Law Review 957 at 958. 
45 Conaghan and Russell charitably make little of my ‘senior moment’, merely politely pointing it out in a 
footnote (above n. 3 at 28). 
46 Above n. 3. 
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that I should have drawn a clearer distinction between Sections 5 and 8 of my 
article.  Section 5 on Rape Myth Methodology focused specifically on 
methodological criticism of the Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual 
Aggression (AMMSA) scale, and also highlighted how problems with AMMSA 
replicated themselves in other forms of rape myth research.  Section 8 was 
planned as an exposition of what I described as the ‘coffee’ myth, with AMMSA 
propositions as the backdrop to this exposition.  But I can see that I unwittingly 
brought criticisms of AMMSA methodology into Section 8 – unclearly and, at one 
point, inaccurately. 
In her Comment on my article, Krahé writes that AMMSA reliably captures 
individual differences in attitudes towards rape,47 that these individual differences 
in attitude are inter-related,48 and that capturing these individual differences 
requires responses to be normally distributed.49  I did not put any of this in issue.  
On the contrary, I explicitly recognise these points in Section 5: 
 
To a large extent, Gerger and others are concerned with the correlation that 
they find between RMA [rape myth attitude] and rape proclivity.  Analysis of 
this is beyond the scope of this article, but if there is solid evidence that those 
men more prone to rape can be predicted by their answers to AMMSA then 
this could be useful information in a range of contexts.  While they have their 
dangers, there is certainly a legitimate role for bell curves.50  
 
In writing this passage with a pronounced focus on the potential correlation 
between RMA and rape proclivity, I did not dismiss all other correlations.51  I did 
not doubt that an individual’s position on the bell curve would tell us something 
about his general attitude towards rape.  In other words, I did not doubt that 
AMMSA was measuring something.  This would have been an unsustainable 
claim, which I did not make.   
In Section 5, I make just two points about AMMSA, both crucial.  The first is 
its shift from defining rape myths as false to defining rape myths as wrong in an 
ethical sense.52  The second is that the results obtained from AMMSA cannot in 
themselves demonstrate the regressiveness of public attitudes.  So I continue 
immediately on from the quotation above as follows: 
 
But what we definitely cannot do with a scale specifically designed to produce 
a bell curve is demonstrate the awfulness of people’s attitudes.  And this is 
47 Ibid. at 7. 
48 Ibid. at 8-9. 
49 Ibid. at 7. 
50 Reece, above n. 1 at 455, emphasis added. 
51 I clarify this in ibid. at footnote 100, which is attached to the end of this passage and reads ‘[s]ee 
Lonsway and Fitzgerald for their related point about the importance of behavioural variables’ (see K. A. 
Lonsway and L. F. Fitzgerald, ‘Rape Myths:  In Review’ (1994) 18 Psychology of Women Quarterly 133).   
52 See below. 
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exactly what some try to do with their AMMSA results53 […]  This is as 
fallacious as making the driving test practically impossible to pass, then 
treating the resulting failure rate as evidence of appalling driving.54  
 
For all of Krahé’s defence of AMMSA methodology, she never responds to this 
crucial criticism.   She complains that I lack ‘even a basic understanding of the 
principles of quantitative methodology in general and attitude measurement in 
particular’,55 but this point is so simple that even a lawyer can understand it.  This 
shockingly simple but important point having been ignored rather than challenged 
in the responses to my article, it would be good to see an end to rape myth 
researchers’ treating AMMSA results as evidence of the extent of RMA. 
So far, so good, but then I re-read Section 8, where I intended to use 
AMMSA examples as a launch pad to a more generalised discussion of the ‘coffee’ 
myth.  Conaghan and Russell have read this Section as being about generalised 
societal beliefs towards sexual consent and, while they disagree with my 
conclusions, their reading is in line with my objectives.  Krahé in contrast has read 
this section as being about AMMSA, and I can see that hers is a viable reading.  It 
would thus have been clearer if I had acknowledged that, in the context of a scale 
consisting of a number of items such as AMMSA, large variations in interpreting 
individual items of the scale would show up.56  Relatedly, I agree with Conaghan 
and Russell that my statement that ‘AMMSA participants are given a binary 
choice’57 is misleading, when AMMSA in fact gives participants a scale.   
 
 
 
TARRING OF THE (WRONG) FIELD? 
 
Conaghan and Russell go far further though, accusing me of ‘excision of much of 
the subtlety of rape myth research’, tarring ‘this whole body of research with the 
same sweeping brush’.58  Apart from the calumny they believe this causes to ‘a rich 
research literature which is, for the most part, nuanced and reflective, attuned to 
changing social and cultural attitudes and always open to new ideas and 
approaches’,59 they suggest that this also hoists me on my own petard, as I 
inconsistently draw on rape myth research as the only evidence we have of public 
attitudes.60   
53 Reece, above n. 1 at 455. 
54 Ibid. at 456. 
55 Above n. 3 at 6. 
56 Ibid. at 7. 
57 Above n. 1 at 462. 
58 Above n. 3 at 32. 
59 Ibid. at 32. 
60 Ibid. at 33. 
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For Conaghan and Russell, the trouble begins with my title which is 
‘formulated to yield an answer to a question – is elite opinion right and popular 
opinion wrong? – the academic merits of which are never put up for discussion’.61  
Granted the title is strongly worded and I hope arresting, it is a question, to which I 
give the answer – as Conaghan and Russell acknowledge62 – ‘to some extent’.  
Turning from the title to the substance, it is at best a gross over-statement to 
suggest that I tar ‘this whole body of research with the same sweeping brush, 
drawing no distinction between casual, unsubstantiated claims (such as Dripps’) 
and carefully thought-out, properly evidenced academic positions’.63  On the 
contrary, I make targeted criticisms of particular methodological features and 
substantive assumptions of specific pieces of rape myth research and individual 
rape myth researchers.  Demonstrating this in full would necessitate reproducing 
my original article.64  This is why I am not hoisted on my own petard, because far 
from ‘tarring the whole field’, I criticised some and relied upon other aspects of rape 
myth research. 
I have already exposed the real criticism here.  While some of the rape myth 
research I relied upon both describes itself and is accepted as feminist research, 
some other pieces do not and are not; and worse still, most if not all the research 
which I criticised is written from a feminist perspective.  It is not that I have 
‘tarred the whole field’ but rather that, so far as Conaghan and Russell are 
concerned, I have ‘tarred the wrong section of the field’. 
Conaghan and Russell take me to task for criticising some of their favoured 
feminist research, but they also castigate me for taking other feminist research a 
little too seriously.  Donald Dripps, having already suffered the ignominy of my 
getting his name wrong, has to face his work being described by Conaghan and 
Russell as ‘crude’65 and ‘unsubstantiated’.66  Having come across Dripps’ writing 
by way of his chapter in Rethinking Rape Law:  International and Comparative 
Perspectives67 – an edited collection specifically praised by Conaghan and Russell68 – 
I had no idea that his opinion was not to be taken seriously.   
61 Ibid. at 32. 
62 Ibid. at 33. 
63 Ibid. at 32. 
64 I will limit myself to listing some of the rape myth researchers whose work I used to develop and 
support my argument: Elizabeth Rice Allgeier; Ronald Ross (‘Behind the Pencil / Paper Measurement of 
Sexual Coercion’ (1996) 26 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1587); David Brereton (‘How Different are 
Rape Trials?  A Comparison of the Cross-Examination of Complainants in Rape and Assault Trials’ 
(1997) 37 British Journal of Criminology 242); Mark Cowling (Date Rape and Consent (Ashgate Publishing:  
Farnham, 1998)); Richard Felson (above n. 2); Nicky Gavey (Just Sex?  The Cultural Scaffolding of Rape 
(Routledge:  London, 2005)); Douglas Koski (‘Jury Decisionmaking in Rape Trials:  A Review and 
Empirical Assessment’ (2002) 38 Criminal Law Bulletin 21); Lynne Phillips (Flirting with Danger:  Young 
Women’s Reflections on Sexuality and Domination (New York University Press:  New York, 2000)); Philip 
Rumney (‘False Allegations of Rape’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 128).    
65 Above n. 3 at 28. 
66 Ibid. at 32. 
67 D. Dripps, ‘Rape, Law and American Society’ in C. McGlynn and V.E. Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape 
Law:  International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge-Cavendish:  London, 2010). 
68 Above n. 3 at 32. 
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Likewise, I had no inkling that – in the interests of demonstrating feminist 
subtlety and nuance – Mary Koss’ view would be so readily thrown out of the 
feminist tent.69  I quote Koss’ comment that ‘strong laws […] cannot successfully 
compete with a citizenry that condones sexual violence’;70 concluding this 
discussion on the next page, I ask whether public attitudes are accurately labelled 
in this way.  Conaghan and Russell write:  
 
This somewhat extreme statement of regressive public attitudes is thereby re-
articulated as mainstream and representative of the general position of rape 
researchers, allowing Reece to challenge the calumny with such righteous 
good sense that one might be forgiven for not pausing to consider who, other 
than (apparently) Koss, actually labels public attitudes in this way.71 
 
Again, fully answering this rhetorical question would necessitate reproducing my 
article.  As I acknowledge when introducing her quotation,72 Koss puts this 
starkly.  However, since the very definition of rape myths is ‘beliefs about rape 
[…] that serve to deny, downplay or justify sexual violence’,73 Koss’ depiction of ‘a 
citizenry that condones sexual violence’ is even on the face of it not far from the 
hegemonic opinion that rape myths are pervasive in the population, shored up by 
unsustainable interpretations of AMMSA results.74   
Conaghan and Russell claim that I quote Koss out of context,75 but when we 
look at the context, it becomes even clearer that Koss is describing the same 
phenomenon as other rape myth researchers: 
 
Sex offending is reinforced by low prosecution and conviction rates 
combined with SV [survivor/victim] self-protective minimizing and justifying 
coping mechanisms.  Social psychological research has shown that not-guilty 
rape verdicts increase both men’s and women’s rape myth acceptance, which 
are one of the best predictors of juror’s (sic) refusal to convict of rape.  Not-
guilty rape verdicts create a self-perpetuating, downward negative spiral in 
public response to date and acquaintance rape because prosecutors fail to 
charge when they think juries will not convict (Frohman, 1996; 1997; 1998).  
Even when reforms have put strong laws in place prohibiting sexual offenses, 
69 Cf. Davison, above n. 42. 
70 Reece, above n. 1 at 451, citing M. P. Koss, ‘Restoring Rape Survivors:  Justice, Advocacy, and a Call to 
Action’ (2006) 1087 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 206 at 221. 
71 Above n. 3 at 34. 
72 Above n. 1 at 451. 
73 H. Gerger et al, ‘The Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression Scale:  Development and 
Validation in German and English’ (2007) 33 Aggressive Behavior 422 at 423. 
74 See above. 
75 Above n. 3 at 34-36. 
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they cannot successfully compete with a citizenry that condones sexual 
violence (Koss, 2000).  [End of section]76   
Some might think that Koss’ is indeed an extreme assessment to draw from her 
evidence, namely not guilty verdicts, and prosecutors second-guessing those not 
guilty verdicts.  Conaghan and Russell complain that Koss’ comment is made in 
the course of a multi-jurisdictional survey, so that it is not targeted at a particular 
population but at the challenge rape supportive attitudes pose, wherever they 
exist.77  I cannot find an implication otherwise in my citation of Koss.  Moreover, 
the unfocused, generalised, character of the comment seems to make it more, not 
less, stark.  
Conaghan and Russell make rather heavy weather of their claim that I quote 
Koss out of context,78 reaching a crescendo when they describe my ‘repeated,79 
out-of-context iteration of the Koss quotation’ as ‘unnecessarily provocative’.80  
Ironically though, in claiming that I re-articulate Koss’ view as ‘mainstream and 
representative of the general position of rape researchers’, so ‘that one might be 
forgiven for not pausing to consider who, other than (apparently) Koss, actually 
labels public attitudes in this way’,81 Conaghan and Russell take my quotation from 
Koss quite out of context.  I spend the next page of the article outlining the extent 
to which other commentators and researchers join issue with Koss, with, yes, 
dense footnoting at this point.82  Furthermore, I return to this question, of the 
extent to which some rape myth researchers believe rape myths have a hold even 
on criminal justice agents, in the last page and a half of the article.83  All in all then, 
I do not accept Conaghan and Russell’s criticism of my citation of Koss. 
Still, I would have been delighted to discover that Conaghan and Russell 
regarded Koss’ as too harsh an assessment.  Unfortunately, as their article 
progresses it becomes ever clearer that they largely share her view.84  By page 39, 
‘indifference to female desire is apparent not only in the discursive application of 
legal rules but is enshrined within the rules themselves’.  By page 42, the House of 
Lords’ decision in R v A (No. 2) in 2001,85 the logic of which derives support 
from ‘associated assumptions that a woman’s word on the matter cannot be 
believed’, is ‘particularly illustrative of the continued purchase of rape myths’.86 
 
 
 
SAMENESS/DIFFERENCE 
76 Koss, above n. 70 at 221. 
77 Above n. 3 at 35. 
78 Ibid. at 34-36. 
79 See above n. 42. 
80 Above n. 3 at 36. 
81 Ibid. at 34. 
82 Above n. 1 at 451-452. 
83 Ibid. at 472-473. 
84 Cf. Davison, above n. 42. 
85 [2001] UKHL 25. 
86 See above. 
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Near the beginning of their response, Conaghan and Russell set me up with the 
impossible view that ‘rape should be viewed in exactly the same way as other 
serious crimes, that it has no claim to distinction or particularity’.87  For good 
measure though, they begin their discussion of sameness and difference by 
ramming home this caricature:  ‘At the heart of Reece’s analysis lies a concern to 
refute any claim rape might have to different or special status within the criminal 
justice system’.88  Their evidence for this is the view that I expressed elsewhere 
that: ‘The sooner we treat rape in the same way as other serious crimes, the better’.  
But this is a view that I expressed in a particular context, at the end of an article 
exclusively dealing with the issue of anonymity.89  I do indeed hold the view that it 
is unhelpful to treat rape complainants differently with regard to anonymity.  But I 
have never expressed nor held the view attributed to me by Conaghan and Russell 
that rape should be treated exactly the same, in all respects – I am not even sure what 
this would entail. 
Standing up this straw man allows Conaghan and Russell to attack it by 
patiently explaining how much more complicated matters are than I appreciate, 
retorting that there isn’t ‘a uniformity in the criminal justice system which rape 
improperly disrupts’.90  In truth, sexual violence is treated differently from other 
crimes in a number of significant respects.91  In the context of the current 
discussion however, this is an aside, for Conaghan and Russell are right that a 
honed and detailed discussion is necessary to determine whether or not the 
particularities of rape imply different treatment in relation to any specific rule or 
policy.  I agree with Conaghan and Russell that ‘it makes little sense to pose 
questions about sameness and difference in the abstract’,92 and I have never done 
so.  What I did argue in my article is that when making claims that rape fares badly 
in some particular respect – disbelief of complainants, or the attrition rate, for 
example – some comparison is not only necessary but inescapable, the absence of 
an explicit comparison invariably indicating an implicit one.  ‘Badly, compared 
with what?’ is a crucial and indeed unavoidable question.   
 
VICTIM-BLAMING 
 
These points become critical concerning the evidence in relation to public blaming 
of rape victims, for which I argued there was less evidence than is often 
87 Above n. 3 at 30. 
88 Ibid. at 36, emphasis added. 
89 ‘Rape trials must be completely open’, 18th February 2013, available at http://www.spiked-
online.com/newsite/article/13353#.U3zQWXc1Hzg.  
90 Above n. 3 at 36. 
91 See e.g. Sexual Offences (Amendment Act) 1992, s. 1; Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, 
ss. 17, 34 and 41. 
92 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 36. 
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supposed.93  I made a simple but significant criticism of the interpretation of 
public opinion surveys such as the Amnesty International UK survey,94 which 
asked people whether or not they believe women are ‘responsible’ for being raped, 
but which is then interpreted as demonstrating that people blame rape victims.  I 
suggested that, given the options of responding yes/no/partly, some respondents 
may have meant ‘responsible’ only in a causal sense, so that it was illegitimate to 
interpret these responses as evidence of victim-blaming.95  While it is heartening 
that there has been a little acceptance of my criticism,96 it is disconcerting that, for 
so long and previously without challenge, so many – academics as well as 
journalists – have cited these surveys as clear-cut evidence of victim-blaming.97   
Having queried the public opinion surveys as evidence of generalised victim-
blaming, I then recognised that there certainly is evidence that some people do 
blame rape victims.98  However, insisting on the importance of comparisons, I 
claimed that ‘there is very little reason to believe that people blame rape victims 
more than they blame other crime victims’.99 
Barbara Krahé is sympathetic towards the necessity of making 
comparisons,100 so, at one point in her Comment on my article, she seeks to 
dispute the validity, not the relevance, of my claim about the extent to which 
people blame victims of diverse crimes.  There she draws attention to her recent 
study comparing attributions of blame towards victims of rape and robbery 
respectively, where participants seemed to blame the rape victim more than the 
robbery victim.101   
This study used six robbery and six rape vignettes, ‘representing three types 
of relationship (strangers, acquaintances, and ex-partners) and two coercive 
strategies (use of force and exploitation of the victim’s intoxicated state)’.102  In 
the Appendix at the end of this article, two of the vignettes are reproduced, 
namely ‘Rape: Strangers, Use of Force’ and ‘Robbery: Strangers, Use of Force’.103  
These were the parallel vignettes in which the study reported the least divergence 
between blame of the robbery victim and blame of the rape victim: when the 
crimes were committed by a stranger using force, the rape victim was found to be 
blamed slightly more than the robbery victim.104 
93 Above n. 1 at 468-472. 
94 Amnesty International UK, Sexual Assault Research Summary Report, 12th October 2005. 
95 Above n. 1 at 468-471. 
96 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 45; L. Ellison and V. E. Munro, ‘Better the Devil you Know? ‘Real 
Rape’ Stereotypes and the Relevance of a Previous Relationship in (mock) Juror Deliberations’ (2013) 17 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 299 at 301. 
97 See Reece, above n. 1 at 468. 
98 Ibid. at 471. 
99 Ibid. at 471. 
100 Above n. 3 at 2. 
101 Ibid. at 4, citing S. Bieneck and B. Krahé, ‘Blaming the Victim and Exonerating the Perpetrator in 
Cases of Rape and Robbery:  Is There a Double Standard?’ (2011) 26 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1785. 
102 Bieneck and Krahé, above n. 101 at 1788. 
103 Ibid. at 1795-1796. 
104 Ibid. at 1789. 
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As I noted in my article,105 two of the four measures used to assess victim 
blame in this study in fact ask participants to assess victim control – (i) ‘How 
much do you think YY had control over the situation?’ – or even victim causation 
- (ii) ‘How likely do you think it is that YY could have avoided the incident?’.106  
These surrogates for blame are particularly problematic when we look in detail at 
the contrasting vignettes made available in the Appendix.  In the rape vignette, 
research participants seem to be discouraged in several ways from answering ‘not 
at all’ to how likely they think it is that the victim could have avoided the incident: 
having declined her male colleague’s offer to walk her home as unnecessary, the 
victim walks home at night through an unlit parking lot, and is attacked while 
pausing to admire the night sky.107  In contrast, in the robbery vignette, the 
research participant does not seem to have similar triggers for finding possibilities 
of avoidance: in the robbery scenario, which takes place during the day, the victim 
takes money out of a cash point, puts the money away before leaving the bank, 
and is then attacked.108  The difference in victim blame between these supposedly 
parallel rape and robbery vignettes is relatively small:109 it would be helpful to 
know the extent to which this difference is accounted for by contrasting answers 
to the question about the possibility of avoidance.110 
As Bieneck and Krahé recognise in this study: 
 
Whereas the tendency to blame the victim and exonerate the perpetrator has 
been studied extensively with respect to sexual assault, little evidence is 
available on whether this tendency is specific to rape cases or affects 
judgments about other criminal offenses of comparable severity in a similar 
fashion.111     
 
As they elucidate,112 theirs is only the third study to have compared rape to other 
offences committed by a male perpetrator against a female victim, the other 
studies having found respectively that robbery victims were blamed more than 
rape victims113 and theft victims were seen as more at fault than rape victims114 
(with Bieneck and Krahé expressing important reservations about the 
105 Above n. 1 at 469. 
106 Bieneck and Krahé, above n. 101 at 1789. 
107 Ibid. at 1795. 
108 Ibid. at 1795-1796. 
109 Ibid. at 1789. 
110 This article states that ‘the full set of scenarios can be obtained from the first author’ (ibid. at 1788; see 
also ibid. at 1796).  However, despite my sending two email requests (on file), to date I have not received 
the other scenarios. 
111 Above n. 101 at 1787. 
112 Ibid. at 1787. 
113 S. Kanekar, N. J. Pinto and D. Mazumdar, ‘Causal and Moral Responsibility of Victims of Rape and 
Robbery’ (1985) 15 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 622. 
114 C. Brems and P. Wagner, ‘Blame of Victim and Perpetrator in Rape versus Theft’ (1994) 134 Journal of 
Social Psychology 363. 
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comparability of the vignettes in the latter study).115  All in all then, while direct, 
more robust, comparisons between rape and other crimes are without doubt a 
helpful trajectory for future research, it would be premature to reach a conclusion 
on the basis of the existing research.  It seems that as yet ‘there is very little reason 
to believe that people blame rape victims more than they blame other crime 
victims’.116      
A contrasting strand in the responses to my argument however is that all of 
the above is of little importance, because it is objectionable to attribute any 
responsibility, to any rape victim, in any sense, even causal: Krahé claims that this 
is indeed the ‘trap that is at the heart of the whole problem of rape myths’,117 
because ‘any responsibility shifted to the victim automatically serves to reduce 
blame attributed to the perpetrator’.118  Krahé’s research has demonstrated an 
unsurprising correlation between victim blame, perpetrator exoneration and 
endorsement of the view: ‘Rape is caused by’ various forms of female 
behaviour.119  However I am not convinced that – specifically in rape cases and 
irrespective of context – people make no more complex causal judgments than 
this see-saw effect, namely that the more the victim is the cause the less the 
perpetrator is the cause.  Still, belief in this see-saw has no doubt contributed to 
the marked current anxiety about any expression of any view that rape victims’ 
behaviour might have any causal relevance.   
For Conaghan and Russell, the ‘question is not whether we consider rape 
victims more or less ‘responsible’ than other crime victims’.  Rather, ‘what is 
problematic about attributions of responsibility in rape cases is the role they can 
play in legally exonerating the rapist.  The burglar by contrast is no less legally 
culpable because a householder has forgotten to lock the door’.120  While 
individual attributions of responsibility or blame do not map straightforwardly on 
to the jury’s collective and deliberative binary verdict,121 in his exhaustive analysis 
of mock jury rape trials, Koski found that a principal theme in jury discussion of 
rape verdicts was indeed victim legitimacy.122  However, this is similar to findings 
in relation to crimes other than rape, where there is likewise evidence that 
attributions of blame and responsibility affect legal outcomes.   
In their study of violent crime, Cretney and Davis found that their research 
sample: 
 
115 Bieneck and Krahé, above n. 101 at 1787. 
116 Reece, above n. 1 at 471. 
117 Above n. 3 at 5. 
118 Ibid. at 6. 
119 J. Temkin and B. Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap:  A Question of Attitude (Hart Publishing:  
Oxford, 2008). 
120 Above n. 3 at 45. 
121 See L. Ellison and V. E. Munro, ‘A Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room?  Critical 
Reflections upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study’ (2010) 13 New 
Criminal Law Review 781 at 787-788; Koski, above n. 64; see contra Temkin and Krahé, above n. 119. 
122 Koski, above n. 64 at 88. 
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[…] included at least a dozen assault victims whose ‘innocence’ was very 
much in question.  Some were drug addicts; some had criminal records in 
relation to other matters; some were suspected by the police of having 
been less than frank in their accounts of what brought them to the area 
where they had been assaulted  […]  This is a problem with a great many 
victims – they are not innocent enough.  They are not innocent enough to 
convince the police of the truth of their story, or to convince them that 
they are prepared to see the prosecution through; and if those hurdles are 
surmounted they may still not be innocent enough to convince a court.123 
 
Cretney and Davis found that drunken victims were particularly likely to be viewed 
with scepticism,124 with far fewer drunken than sober victims seeing their assailant 
convicted.125 
When Baumer et al examined a random sample of 1,990 murder cases in the 
United States,126 they found that: 
 
Incidents in which the victim provoked the defendant are less likely to be 
prosecuted, less likely to lead to indictment, and more likely to lead to 
conviction on a reduced charge.  Incidents during which the victim engaged 
in other disreputable conduct are less likely to be carried forward and more 
likely to result in conviction on a reduced charge.  In contrast, past 
disreputable conduct has no significant effect on any of the legal outcomes.127  
 
Baumer et al summarise: 
 
These findings show that legal outcomes are affected by victims’ conduct at 
the time of the incident, not by their past conduct.  Apparently, decision 
making in murder cases reflects attributions of responsibility for the event, 
rather than beliefs about the degree of harm based on the victim’s general 
character.128 
 
They conclude: 
 
In sum, our analyses indicate that victim characteristics affect the processing 
of murder cases.  The effects are modest but are consistent with the general 
123 A. Cretney and G. Davis, Punishing Violence (Routledge, London:  1995) 64-65. 
124 Ibid. at 85. 
125 Ibid. at 86. 
126 E. P. Baumer, S. F. Messner and R. B. Felson, ‘The Role of Victim Character and Victim Conduct in 
the Disposition of Murder Cases’ (2000) 17 Justice Quarterly 281 at 291. 
127 Ibid. at 297. 
128 Ibid. at 303. 
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claim that killings of disreputable or stigmatized victims tend to be treated 
more leniently by the criminal justice system.129 
 
There is thus little reason to believe that the role that attributions of responsibility 
play in legally exonerating the perpetrator is unique to rape cases.  
 
THE JUSTICE GAP 
 
There does seem to be some unnecessary resistance to my attempt to insist on 
comparators.  In my article, I examine the first point at which the crime of rape is 
seen as different in relation to the justice gap, which is that it is frequently 
unacknowledged by the victim.  In this regard, I query Myhill and Allen’s 
speculation that ‘[s]urvivors of sexual attacks may be less likely to view themselves 
as victims of a “crime’ than people who suffer, for example, property crimes’.130  I 
respond: 
 
This seems implausible in the light of all those times when a boyfriend 
‘borrows’ a ten pound note from his girlfriend’s purse, a son repeatedly 
‘forgets’ to repay the loan he received from his mother, or a friend 
manoeuvres himself out of paying his share of the restaurant bill.131  
 
Conaghan and Russell object that these scenarios are highly unlikely to constitute 
crimes, because, for example, a boyfriend who ‘borrows’ money or a son who 
‘forgets’ to repay a loan does not have the intention permanently to deprive, and 
may not be dishonest.132  This seems unnecessarily caustic.  I appreciate that theft 
requires the intention permanently to deprive as well as dishonesty, and my use of 
quotation marks around ‘borrows’ and ‘forgets’ was meant to indicate, in as brief a 
manner as possible, that this was not really what the boyfriend or son was up to.  
Conaghan and Russell are on no firmer ground with their next objection that, in 
contrast, ‘Myhill and Allen’s comments about under-reporting are directed to 
experiences legally classifiable as rape’.133  First of all, they quite explicitly are not – 
they are directed at the much broader and looser category of sexual attacks.  
Secondly, Conaghan and Russell cannot, they just cannot, be unaware of the 
voluminous extant critique of sexual assault surveys highlighting the ways in which 
experiences that do not necessarily constitute crimes routinely gain inclusion in 
such surveys.134  Finally, far from being ‘the greatest irony’135 of my examples of 
unacknowledged property crimes, their gendered nature was deliberate and 
129 Ibid. at 304. 
130 A. Myhill and J. Allen, Rape and Sexual Assault of Women:  The Extent and Nature of the Problem, Home 
Office Research Study 237 (2002) 7. 
131 Above n. 1 at 450. 
132 Above n. 3 at 38. 
133 Ibid. at 38. 
134 For a survey, see Cowling, above n. 64. 
135 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 38. 
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conscious on my part – an attempt to make an important point as succinctly as 
possible.               
My discussion of the justice gap was meant to put some questions on the 
table and unsettle some ingrained assumptions, in the context of a broader and 
more wide-ranging article.  It was not intended as a finely grained comparison of 
diverse crime conviction and attrition rates, which would, at the very least, have 
taken an entire article in itself.  This area is crying out for careful comparisons, and 
there are intricate questions of judgment involved about the proper comparisons 
to make.  I mention burglary in my article as the crime with the then most similar 
attrition rate to rape,136 but of course there are glaring differences between 
burglary and rape, and I briefly allude to these137 (as opposed to dismissing 
them).138  Conaghan and Russell and Temkin choose murder as the appropriate 
comparison to rape when it comes to conviction rates,139 following the Ministry of 
Justice Overview of Sexual Offending in England and Wales.140  But compared 
with other serious or violent crimes, the conviction rate for murder is unusually 
high,141 so it is unsurprising that the rape conviction rate compares unfavourably 
with the murder conviction rate. 
For Temkin and Krahé,142 since convictions depend on there being a 
defendant, ‘the critical comparison is the conviction rate relative to the rate of 
cases in which a suspect has been identified’.143  Accordingly, Krahé compiles a 
table of conviction rates that draws a veil over the point before a potential 
offender has been identified, comparing the proportion of offenders to 
convictions.144  Temkin puts this point vividly:  ‘The most recent figures tell us 
that the identity of a rapist is known in 90% of cases.  They could be prosecuted, 
but very often they are not.’145   
Without a doubt, identifying a suspect removes one enormous obstacle to 
conviction.  Nevertheless, the equation ‘suspected offender = prosecution’ is 
frighteningly reductionist, obscuring the fact that a prosecution rests on there 
being sufficient evidence as well as a suspect, and also over-looking the fact that 
finding a suspect is a human endeavour, not a fixed natural circumstance.146  
Accordingly, once we decide that cases where a suspect has not been identified 
136 Above n. 1 at 449. 
137 Ibid. at 449-451. 
138 See Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 37. 
139 Ibid. at 36-37; Temkin, above n. 3 at 22:27-23:00 minutes. 
140 Ministry of Justice, Home Office and the Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Sexual Offending 
in England and Wales (2013) 37-40. 
141 Ministry of Justice Statistics bulletin, Criminal Justice Statistics 2013:  England and Wales (2014) 15 and 17. 
142 Temkin, above n. 3 at 19:30-20:08 minutes; Krahé, above n. 3 at 2-4. 
143 Krahé, above n. 3 at 2. 
144 Ibid. at 3-4. 
145 Temkin, above n. 3 at 19:50-20:08 minutes. 
146 So if we as a society felt that too many armed robbers or stranger rapists were escaping detection, 
there are measures we could choose to take to increase detection rates, for example more police on the 
streets. 
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can be counted out, it becomes a value judgment whether other factors can count 
out cases, and if so which.  For example, it is a matter of judgment how significant 
the ratio is between convictions and cases with corroborative evidence.  Rape 
cases present their own particular difficulties, and it is a judgment call whether 
these are more or less insurmountable than finding a suspect.147  
 
 
TRUTH AND FALSITY 
 
In my OJLS article, I criticised the relatively recent shift in the definition of rape 
myth, from a belief that needed to be demonstrably false, to a belief that may or 
may not be false, but needs to be wrong in an ethical sense.148  ‘Facts are not 
myths’, Conaghan and Russell explain that I claim, ‘nor are opinions based on 
those facts’.149  Conaghan and Russell take exception to this because I am 
substituting ‘an entirely different conception of ‘myth’ from that of the researchers 
whose work [I am] critiquing’.150  In one sense, their criticism can be easily dealt 
with: yes, that is exactly what I am doing, because, as they report, I do not agree 
with describing facts as myths.  But this seems to be a disagreement rather than a 
criticism.   
So what is their criticism?  First of all, they complain that my ‘substitution of 
a different conception of ‘myth’ from that deployed by rape researchers is so 
subtly executed one barely notices that [I offer] no adequate justification for the 
move’.151  There was in fact nothing subtle about this ‘move’.  Near the beginning 
of the article, I devote over a page to this point, firmly drawing the reader’s 
attention to my perspective: 
 
The admission into the category of rape myths of beliefs that are not 
demonstrably false and may on occasions be true sets the stage for my core 
argument.  There are undoubtedly a range of attitudes on which the general 
public and rape myth researchers – and for that matter diverse rape myth 
researchers – do not see eye to eye.  […]  But where what we have is a 
difference of opinion on a normative question […] this needs to be discussed 
and debated, rather than stigmatized in, or still worse excluded from, the 
discussion as a rape myth.152  
 
In disagreeing with the definition of ‘rape myth’ currently employed by the rape 
myth research community, I could perhaps be criticised for my audacity, but 
definitely not my subtlety. 
147 See Reece, above n. 1 at 449. 
148 Ibid. at 453. 
149 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 34. 
150 Ibid. at 34. 
151 Ibid. at 34. 
152 Reece, above n. 1 at 454. 
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Conaghan and Russell clarify that the problem is that at no point do I address 
the issues which lead rape myth researchers to adopt their definition,153 allowing 
me to ‘avoid all concerns about the prescriptive dimensions of rape myths 
discourse and to treat rape myths solely in terms of descriptive validity’.154  This is 
somewhat inconsistent with their earlier clamour that I leave ‘no apparent stone 
unturned in documenting the deleterious effects of rape research on public 
understanding and debate’.155   
They clarify further: 
 
Reece never actually engages with the prescriptive dimensions of rape myths 
notwithstanding that this is the key concern animating rape myth research – 
not that the factual configurations comprising rape myths may on occasion be 
true but rather that they are treated as generalizable truths which function 
normatively to shape perception and inform judgments.156  
 
There is truly a voluminous literature on the perils of making inferences about an 
individual instance from a background generalisation; in a different context, I have 
indeed recognised and explored these dangers.157  Conaghan and Russell are of 
course right that where jurors start from a generalised belief that women lie about 
rape then move seamlessly to the inference that this particular woman is lying, this 
precludes a just outcome.158  On the other hand, I remain unconvinced either that 
it is possible for jurors to manage without background generalisations159 or that 
this problem is currently more acute for complainants in rape trials than for other 
trial participants.160  Arguably, given that some background generalisation is 
unavoidable, the best that we can hope for is to enhance the accuracy of our 
background generalisations, at the same time as reminding ourselves that even 
when accurate, they are only generalisations.  None of this is aided by telling 
people that they believe myths when their beliefs have not been shown to be 
inaccurate, or even have been shown to be accurate.        
This leads on to perhaps the most important point in this interchange.  
Language is no doubt pliable, but when most people hear ‘myth’ they think ‘false’.  
If rape myth researchers wish to detach ‘myth’ from ‘falsity’, then they need to do 
153 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 34. 
154 Ibid. at 34. 
155 Ibid. at 31. 
156 Ibid. at 34. 
157 H. Reece (2010) ‘‘Bright line rules may be appropriate in some cases, but not where the object is to 
promote the welfare of the child’:  Barring in the best interests of the child?’ (2010) 22 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly  422. 
158 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 34. 
159 See Reece, above n. 1 at 454. 
160 An extreme recent example is the acquittal of a defendant in a rape trial prompting the comment from 
a feminist academic on twitter that ‘another rapist goes back to work as usual’, 6th February 2014, 
available at https://twitter.com/sarahjkeenan.  Such an attitude amongst jurors would preclude a just 
outcome for the defendant in a rape trial. 
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this with a flashing neon light above and a huge pointing red finger to the side, 
and they have not.  There is a great deal of confusion and slippage in the way that 
the term ‘rape myth’ is understood and indeed used, even in academic discourse 
let alone public discourse.161  Any part that I may have played in foregrounding 
this slippage makes this whole exchange worthwhile for me. 
To illustrate, Krahé opens her Comment with the claim that ‘many rape 
myths are, in fact, false beliefs that can be refuted on the basis of empirical 
research’.162  As she is one of the world’s foremost rape myth researchers, I cannot 
read her as doubting that rape myths no longer need to be false.  So it is 
instructive that Krahé still regards it as important to emphasise their empirical 
dimension.  The example she gives is the ‘myth’ that stranger rape is more serious 
than acquaintance rape.  In my article, I accept that there is strong enough 
evidence of public belief in this hierarchy of seriousness, but I query whether this 
belief deserves to be designated a myth.163  Krahé replies that indeed it does, 
because psychological evidence demonstrates that acquaintance rape is at least as 
damaging as, if not more damaging than, stranger rape.  She concludes: ‘It is 
obvious here that Reece does not have a sufficient grasp of the psychological 
literature on the effects of rape victimisation’.164   
It is true that a detailed examination of the relative trauma caused by diverse 
forms of rape was beyond the scope of my article.  It is also true that some 
research shows that some people hold the misapprehension – myth - that 
relationship rape is per se less traumatic than stranger rape.165  But Krahé is reading 
off the seriousness of a crime from the trauma to the victim, when the latter is but 
one dimension of the former.  With the benefit of hindsight, I can see that I 
should have made it clearer that I was referring to seriousness not trauma; at the 
time, I thought this was plain from my comment that ‘judgments about 
seriousness are multi-dimensional, encompassing such diverse factors as the 
offender’s motivation, the victim’s trauma, and the public interest’.166  Still, such 
easy elision between seriousness and trauma is an interesting illustration of the 
seemingly inexorable rise of victim-centred justice.167     
Conaghan and Russell are quite wrong that I was unconcerned with the 
prescriptive dimension of rape myth discourse.168  One of my main prescriptive 
concerns was the rhetorical power that is gained from describing a normative 
opinion or even an accurate belief as a ‘rape myth’, placing the point of view 
beyond discussion and thus enabling debate on the question to be very effectively 
161 See Reece, above n. 1 at 453-454. 
162 Above n. 3 at 1. 
163 Above n. 1 at 457-458. 
164 Above n. 3 at 5. 
165 See e.g. S. Ben-David and O. Schneider, ‘Rape Perceptions, Gender Role Attitudes, and Victim-
Perpetrator Acquaintance’ (2005) 53 Sex Roles 385 at 395; A. Clarke et al, Attitudes to Date Rape and 
Relationship Rape:  A Qualitative Study (2002) 38, 41 and 48. 
166 Above n. 1 at 458. 
167 See R. N. Lancaster, Sex Panic and the Punitive State (University of California Press:  California, 2011) ch 
7. 
168 Conaghan and Russell, above n. 3 at 34. 
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shut down.  My main focus in the article being elsewhere, I made this point briefly 
at the end.169  A few months later, I was invited by my employer, the London 
School of Economics Law Department, to take part in a debate entitled ‘Is rape 
different?’, prompted by publication of this research.170  In response, feminists@law, 
an open access journal of feminist legal scholarship emanating from Kent Law 
School, produced an editorial to which they invited readers to add their names in 
support.171  My contribution to the debate being to argue that the existence and 
prevalence of rape myths have been over-stated,172 their reply that my arguments 
‘appeal to existing rape myths in society’ was beyond parody.173  Their conclusion, 
which they asked readers to sign in support of, was:  ‘We deplore LSE Law’s 
decision to give a platform to [these] dangerous and unsupported views […] As 
feminist academics we wish to condemn the decision of the LSE Law Department 
to hold this event and to continue to defend it’.174  This, from feminists, was truly 
an object lesson in how slapping on the label ‘rape myth’ serves to legitimise the 
call to close down discussion and debate.  They made this point for me, far more 
eloquently and effectively than I ever could have with my words.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 Above n. 1 at 473. 
170 Above n. 3. 
171 The Editors, ‘A Response to the LSE Event “Is Rape Different?”’ (2013) 3 feminists@law 1. 
172 Above n. 3. 
173 Above n. 171 at 1. 
174 Above n. 171 at 3. 
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